diff --git a/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs b/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
index ff5189f9346..3d7ca378a3f 100644
--- a/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
 		Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		#[rustfmt::skip]
 		let random_bytes = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]];
 		ExpandedKey::new(random_bytes)
diff --git a/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs b/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
index eb9d51d487d..5028a532670 100644
--- a/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/full_stack.rs
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
 		Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		self.inbound_payment_key
 	}
 
diff --git a/fuzz/src/onion_message.rs b/fuzz/src/onion_message.rs
index 85ba6263b2a..d58b44fa7b6 100644
--- a/fuzz/src/onion_message.rs
+++ b/fuzz/src/onion_message.rs
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
 		Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		unreachable!()
 	}
 
diff --git a/lightning/src/blinded_path/message.rs b/lightning/src/blinded_path/message.rs
index 218b2282141..120757ddb04 100644
--- a/lightning/src/blinded_path/message.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/blinded_path/message.rs
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ use crate::types::payment::PaymentHash;
 use crate::util::scid_utils;
 use crate::util::ser::{FixedLengthReader, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, Writeable, Writer};
 
-use core::mem;
 use core::ops::Deref;
 use core::time::Duration;
+use core::{cmp, mem};
 
 /// A blinded path to be used for sending or receiving a message, hiding the identity of the
 /// recipient.
@@ -74,6 +74,26 @@ impl BlindedMessagePath {
 		local_node_receive_key: ReceiveAuthKey, context: MessageContext, entropy_source: ES,
 		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
 	) -> Result<Self, ()>
+	where
+		ES::Target: EntropySource,
+	{
+		BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
+			intermediate_nodes,
+			recipient_node_id,
+			0,
+			local_node_receive_key,
+			context,
+			entropy_source,
+			secp_ctx,
+		)
+	}
+
+	/// Same as [`BlindedMessagePath::new`] but allow specifying a number of dummy hops
+	pub fn new_with_dummy_hops<ES: Deref, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
+		intermediate_nodes: &[MessageForwardNode], recipient_node_id: PublicKey,
+		dummy_hop_count: usize, local_node_receive_key: ReceiveAuthKey, context: MessageContext,
+		entropy_source: ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
+	) -> Result<Self, ()>
 	where
 		ES::Target: EntropySource,
 	{
@@ -91,6 +111,7 @@ impl BlindedMessagePath {
 				secp_ctx,
 				intermediate_nodes,
 				recipient_node_id,
+				dummy_hop_count,
 				context,
 				&blinding_secret,
 				local_node_receive_key,
@@ -266,6 +287,23 @@ pub(crate) struct ForwardTlvs {
 	pub(crate) next_blinding_override: Option<PublicKey>,
 }
 
+/// Represents the dummy TLV encoded immediately before the actual [`ReceiveTlvs`] in a blinded path.
+/// These TLVs are intended for the final node and are recursively authenticated until the real
+/// [`ReceiveTlvs`] is reached.
+///
+/// Their purpose is to arbitrarily extend the path length, obscuring the receiver's position in the
+/// route and thereby enhancing privacy.
+pub(crate) struct DummyTlv {}
+
+impl Writeable for DummyTlv {
+	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+		encode_tlv_stream!(writer, {
+			(65539, (), required),
+		});
+		Ok(())
+	}
+}
+
 /// Similar to [`ForwardTlvs`], but these TLVs are for the final node.
 pub(crate) struct ReceiveTlvs {
 	/// If `context` is `Some`, it is used to identify the blinded path that this onion message is
@@ -621,15 +659,24 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DNSResolverContext, {
 /// to pad message blinded path's [`BlindedHop`]
 pub(crate) const MESSAGE_PADDING_ROUND_OFF: usize = 100;
 
+/// The maximum number of dummy hops that can be added to a blinded path.
+/// This is to prevent paths from becoming too long and potentially causing
+/// issues with message processing or routing.
+pub(crate) const MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT: usize = 10;
+
 /// Construct blinded onion message hops for the given `intermediate_nodes` and `recipient_node_id`.
 pub(super) fn blinded_hops<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
 	secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, intermediate_nodes: &[MessageForwardNode],
-	recipient_node_id: PublicKey, context: MessageContext, session_priv: &SecretKey,
-	local_node_receive_key: ReceiveAuthKey,
+	recipient_node_id: PublicKey, dummy_hop_count: usize, context: MessageContext,
+	session_priv: &SecretKey, local_node_receive_key: ReceiveAuthKey,
 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedHop>, secp256k1::Error> {
+	let dummy_count = cmp::min(dummy_hop_count, MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT);
 	let pks = intermediate_nodes
 		.iter()
 		.map(|node| (node.node_id, None))
+		.chain(
+			core::iter::repeat((recipient_node_id, Some(local_node_receive_key))).take(dummy_count),
+		)
 		.chain(core::iter::once((recipient_node_id, Some(local_node_receive_key))));
 	let is_compact = intermediate_nodes.iter().any(|node| node.short_channel_id.is_some());
 
@@ -644,6 +691,7 @@ pub(super) fn blinded_hops<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
 		.map(|next_hop| {
 			ControlTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs { next_hop, next_blinding_override: None })
 		})
+		.chain((0..dummy_count).map(|_| ControlTlvs::Dummy(DummyTlv {})))
 		.chain(core::iter::once(ControlTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs { context: Some(context) })));
 
 	if is_compact {
diff --git a/lightning/src/blinded_path/utils.rs b/lightning/src/blinded_path/utils.rs
index 976c821ad5b..b3b4714054d 100644
--- a/lightning/src/blinded_path/utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/blinded_path/utils.rs
@@ -276,16 +276,37 @@ impl<T: Writeable> Writeable for BlindedPathWithPadding<T> {
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
-/// Checks if all the packets in the blinded path are properly padded.
+/// Verifies whether all hops in the blinded path follow the expected padding scheme.
+///
+/// In the padded encoding scheme, each hop's encrypted payload is expected to be of the form:
+/// `n * padding_round_off + extra`, where:
+/// - `padding_round_off` is the fixed block size to which unencrypted payloads are padded.
+/// - `n` is a positive integer (n ≥ 1).
+/// - `extra` is the fixed overhead added during encryption (assumed uniform across hops).
+///
+/// This function infers the `extra` from the first hop, and checks that all other hops conform
+/// to the same pattern.
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// - `true` if all hop payloads are padded correctly.
+/// - `false` if padding is incorrectly applied or intentionally absent (e.g., in compact paths).
 pub fn is_padded(hops: &[BlindedHop], padding_round_off: usize) -> bool {
 	let first_hop = hops.first().expect("BlindedPath must have at least one hop");
-	let first_payload_size = first_hop.encrypted_payload.len();
+	let first_len = first_hop.encrypted_payload.len();
+
+	// Early rejection: if the first hop is too small, it can't be correctly padded.
+	if first_len <= padding_round_off {
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	// Compute the extra encrypted overhead by taking the remainder.
+	let extra = first_len % padding_round_off;
+
+	// All hops must follow the same padding structure:
+	// their length minus `extra` should be a clean multiple of `padding_round_off`.
 
-	// The unencrypted payload data is padded before getting encrypted.
-	// Assuming the first payload is padded properly, get the extra data length.
-	let extra_length = first_payload_size % padding_round_off;
 	hops.iter().all(|hop| {
-		// Check that every packet is padded to the round off length subtracting the extra length.
-		(hop.encrypted_payload.len() - extra_length) % padding_round_off == 0
+		let len = hop.encrypted_payload.len();
+		len > extra && (len - extra) % padding_round_off == 0
 	})
 }
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/async_payments_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/async_payments_tests.rs
index 7ee48225f78..4923147248e 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/async_payments_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/async_payments_tests.rs
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ fn amount_doesnt_match_invreq() {
 			valid_invreq = Some(invoice_request.clone());
 			*invoice_request = offer
 				.request_invoice(
-					&nodes[0].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key(),
+					&nodes[0].keys_manager.get_expanded_key(),
 					Nonce::from_entropy_source(nodes[0].keys_manager),
 					&secp_ctx,
 					payment_id,
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs
index 675d628ef2c..8879674ac7b 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ pub fn blinded_payment_path(
 	};
 
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 
 	let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ fn do_one_hop_blinded_path(success: bool) {
 		payment_context: PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {}),
 	};
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 
 	let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ fn mpp_to_one_hop_blinded_path() {
 		payment_context: PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {}),
 	};
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 	let blinded_path = BlindedPaymentPath::new(
 		&[], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), payee_tlvs, u64::MAX, TEST_FINAL_CLTV as u16,
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ fn custom_tlvs_to_blinded_path() {
 		payment_context: PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {}),
 	};
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 	let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 	let blinded_path = BlindedPaymentPath::new(
@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ fn fails_receive_tlvs_authentication() {
 		payment_context: PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {}),
 	};
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 
 	let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ fn route_blinding_spec_test_vector() {
 			}
 			Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 		}
-		fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey { unreachable!() }
+		fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey { unreachable!() }
 		fn get_node_id(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> { unreachable!() }
 		fn sign_invoice(
 			&self, _invoice: &RawBolt11Invoice, _recipient: Recipient,
@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@ fn test_trampoline_inbound_payment_decoding() {
 			}
 			Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 		}
-		fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey { unreachable!() }
+		fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey { unreachable!() }
 		fn get_node_id(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> { unreachable!() }
 		fn sign_invoice(
 			&self, _invoice: &RawBolt11Invoice, _recipient: Recipient,
@@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ fn do_test_trampoline_single_hop_receive(success: bool) {
 		};
 
 		let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-		let expanded_key = nodes[2].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+		let expanded_key = nodes[2].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 		let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 		let carol_unblinded_tlvs = payee_tlvs.encode();
 
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index 2214676ceb7..56eb073b858 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
 		requires_blinded_error: bool,
 		/// Set if we are receiving a keysend to a blinded path, meaning we created the
 		/// [`PaymentSecret`] and should verify it using our
-		/// [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`].
+		/// [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`].
 		has_recipient_created_payment_secret: bool,
 		/// The [`InvoiceRequest`] associated with the [`Offer`] corresponding to this payment.
 		invoice_request: Option<InvoiceRequest>,
@@ -3715,7 +3715,7 @@ where
 		let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 		secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
 
-		let expanded_inbound_key = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key();
+		let expanded_inbound_key = node_signer.get_expanded_key();
 		let our_network_pubkey = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
 
 		let flow = OffersMessageFlow::new(
@@ -16513,7 +16513,7 @@ where
 			}
 		}
 
-		let expanded_inbound_key = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key();
+		let expanded_inbound_key = args.node_signer.get_expanded_key();
 
 		let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
 		if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/inbound_payment.rs b/lightning/src/ln/inbound_payment.rs
index a7d45b896a9..2aeba0cdf89 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/inbound_payment.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/inbound_payment.rs
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
 // retrieve said payment type bits.
 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
 
-/// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded. Returned by [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`].
+/// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded. Returned by [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`].
 ///
-/// [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key
+/// [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_expanded_key
 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
 pub struct ExpandedKey {
 	/// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ fn min_final_cltv_expiry_delta_from_metadata(bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN]) -> u16 {
 /// `ChannelManager` is required. Useful for generating invoices for [phantom node payments] without
 /// a `ChannelManager`.
 ///
-/// `keys` is generated by calling [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`]. It is recommended to
+/// `keys` is generated by calling [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`]. It is recommended to
 /// cache this value and not regenerate it for each new inbound payment.
 ///
 /// `current_time` is a Unix timestamp representing the current time.
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ fn min_final_cltv_expiry_delta_from_metadata(bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN]) -> u16 {
 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
 ///
 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
-/// [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key
+/// [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_expanded_key
 pub fn create<ES: Deref>(
 	keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
 	entropy_source: &ES, current_time: u64, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>,
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ fn construct_payment_secret(
 /// For payments including a custom `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`, the metadata is constructed as:
 ///   payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || min_final_cltv_expiry_delta (2 bytes) || expiry (6 bytes)
 ///
-/// In both cases the result is then encrypted using a key derived from [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`].
+/// In both cases the result is then encrypted using a key derived from [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`].
 ///
 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
 /// match what was constructed.
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ fn construct_payment_secret(
 ///
 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
 ///
-/// [`NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_inbound_payment_key
+/// [`NodeSigner::get_expanded_key`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::get_expanded_key
 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/invoice_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/invoice_utils.rs
index 509cb2e3b7b..c08d4fa14c5 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/invoice_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/invoice_utils.rs
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ where
 		},
 	};
 
-	let keys = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let keys = node_signer.get_expanded_key();
 	let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = if let Some(payment_hash) = payment_hash {
 		let payment_secret = create_from_hash(
 			&keys,
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/max_payment_path_len_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/max_payment_path_len_tests.rs
index 4efa105e0ad..177050baf90 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/max_payment_path_len_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/max_payment_path_len_tests.rs
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ fn one_hop_blinded_path_with_custom_tlv() {
 		payment_context: PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {}),
 	};
 	let nonce = Nonce([42u8; 16]);
-	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[2].keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = chanmon_cfgs[2].keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let payee_tlvs = payee_tlvs.authenticate(nonce, &expanded_key);
 	let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 	let blinded_path = BlindedPaymentPath::new(
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs b/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs
index e0219a5523f..371dd591588 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/msgs.rs
@@ -3548,7 +3548,7 @@ where
 				},
 				ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Receive(receive_tlvs) } => {
 					let ReceiveTlvs { tlvs, authentication: (hmac, nonce) } = receive_tlvs;
-					let expanded_key = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key();
+					let expanded_key = node_signer.get_expanded_key();
 					if tlvs.verify_for_offer_payment(hmac, nonce, &expanded_key).is_err() {
 						return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 					}
@@ -3700,7 +3700,7 @@ where
 					readable: BlindedTrampolineTlvs::Receive(receive_tlvs),
 				} => {
 					let ReceiveTlvs { tlvs, authentication: (hmac, nonce) } = receive_tlvs;
-					let expanded_key = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key();
+					let expanded_key = node_signer.get_expanded_key();
 					if tlvs.verify_for_offer_payment(hmac, nonce, &expanded_key).is_err() {
 						return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 					}
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
index ba9858be197..6bda12c8069 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
@@ -46,11 +46,12 @@ use bitcoin::network::Network;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1};
 use core::time::Duration;
 use crate::blinded_path::IntroductionNode;
-use crate::blinded_path::message::BlindedMessagePath;
+use crate::blinded_path::message::{BlindedMessagePath, MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT};
 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentContext};
 use crate::blinded_path::message::OffersContext;
 use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, HTLCHandlingFailureType, PaidBolt12Invoice, PaymentFailureReason, PaymentPurpose};
 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry, self};
+use crate::offers::test_utils::FixedEntropy;
 use crate::types::features::Bolt12InvoiceFeatures;
 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
 use crate::ln::msgs::{BaseMessageHandler, ChannelMessageHandler, Init, NodeAnnouncement, OnionMessage, OnionMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress, UnsignedGossipMessage, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement};
@@ -60,11 +61,12 @@ use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{InvoiceRequest, InvoiceRequestFields};
 use crate::offers::nonce::Nonce;
 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
-use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageSendInstructions, NodeIdMessageRouter, NullMessageRouter, PeeledOnion};
+use crate::onion_message::messenger::{DefaultMessageRouter, Destination, MessageSendInstructions, NodeIdMessageRouter, NullMessageRouter, PeeledOnion};
 use crate::onion_message::offers::OffersMessage;
 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, RouteParametersConfig};
 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::sync::Arc;
 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
 
 /// This used to determine whether we built a compact path or not, but now its just a random
@@ -438,6 +440,63 @@ fn prefers_more_connected_nodes_in_blinded_paths() {
 	}
 }
 
+/// Tests the dummy hop behavior of Offers based on the message router used:
+/// - Compact paths (`DefaultMessageRouter`) should not include dummy hops.
+/// - Node ID paths (`NodeIdMessageRouter`) may include 0 to [`MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT`] dummy hops.
+#[test]
+fn check_dummy_hop_pattern_in_offer() {
+	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+	let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+	create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 10_000_000, 1_000_000_000);
+
+	let alice = &nodes[0];
+	let deterministic_entropy = Arc::new(FixedEntropy);
+
+	// Case 1: DefaultMessageRouter → uses compact blinded paths (via SCIDs)
+	// Expected: No dummy hops; each path contains only the recipient.
+	let default_router = DefaultMessageRouter::new(alice.network_graph, deterministic_entropy.clone());
+
+	let compact_offer = alice.node
+		.create_offer_builder_using_router(&default_router).unwrap()
+		.build().unwrap();
+
+	assert!(!compact_offer.paths().is_empty());
+
+	for path in compact_offer.paths() {
+		assert_eq!(
+			path.blinded_hops().len(), 1,
+			"Compact paths must include only the recipient"
+		);
+	}
+
+	// Case 2: NodeIdMessageRouter → uses node ID-based blinded paths
+	// Expected: 0 to MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT dummy hops, followed by recipient.
+	let node_id_router = NodeIdMessageRouter::new(alice.network_graph, deterministic_entropy);
+
+	let padded_offer = alice.node
+		.create_offer_builder_using_router(&node_id_router).unwrap()
+		.build().unwrap();
+
+	assert!(!padded_offer.paths().is_empty());
+
+	for path in padded_offer.paths() {
+		let hops = path.blinded_hops();
+		assert!(
+			hops.len() > 1,
+			"Non-compact paths must include at least one dummy hop plus recipient"
+		);
+
+		let dummy_count = hops.len() - 1;
+		assert!(
+			dummy_count <= MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT,
+			"Dummy hops must not exceed MAX_DUMMY_HOPS_COUNT"
+		);
+	}
+}
+
 /// Checks that blinded paths are compact for short-lived offers.
 #[test]
 fn creates_short_lived_offer() {
@@ -2275,7 +2334,7 @@ fn fails_paying_invoice_with_unknown_required_features() {
 	let payment_paths = invoice.payment_paths().to_vec();
 	let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
 
-	let expanded_key = alice.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key();
+	let expanded_key = alice.keys_manager.get_expanded_key();
 	let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 
 	let created_at = alice.node.duration_since_epoch();
diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
index 3cbb618dc0b..bea7182c2aa 100644
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
@@ -443,6 +443,34 @@ fn one_blinded_hop() {
 	pass_along_path(&nodes);
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn blinded_path_with_dummy() {
+	let nodes = create_nodes(2);
+	let test_msg = TestCustomMessage::Pong;
+
+	let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+	let context = MessageContext::Custom(Vec::new());
+	let entropy = &*nodes[1].entropy_source;
+	let receive_key = nodes[1].messenger.node_signer.get_receive_auth_key();
+	let blinded_path = BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
+		&[],
+		nodes[1].node_id,
+		5,
+		receive_key,
+		context,
+		entropy,
+		&secp_ctx,
+	)
+	.unwrap();
+	// Ensure that dummy hops are added to the blinded path.
+	assert_eq!(blinded_path.blinded_hops().len(), 6);
+	let destination = Destination::BlindedPath(blinded_path);
+	let instructions = MessageSendInstructions::WithoutReplyPath { destination };
+	nodes[0].messenger.send_onion_message(test_msg, instructions).unwrap();
+	nodes[1].custom_message_handler.expect_message(TestCustomMessage::Pong);
+	pass_along_path(&nodes);
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn two_unblinded_two_blinded() {
 	let nodes = create_nodes(5);
@@ -658,9 +686,10 @@ fn test_blinded_path_padding_for_full_length_path() {
 	let context = MessageContext::Custom(vec![0u8; 42]);
 	let entropy = &*nodes[3].entropy_source;
 	let receive_key = nodes[3].messenger.node_signer.get_receive_auth_key();
-	let blinded_path = BlindedMessagePath::new(
+	let blinded_path = BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
 		&intermediate_nodes,
 		nodes[3].node_id,
+		5,
 		receive_key,
 		context,
 		entropy,
@@ -694,9 +723,10 @@ fn test_blinded_path_no_padding_for_compact_path() {
 	let context = MessageContext::Custom(vec![0u8; 42]);
 	let entropy = &*nodes[3].entropy_source;
 	let receive_key = nodes[3].messenger.node_signer.get_receive_auth_key();
-	let blinded_path = BlindedMessagePath::new(
+	let blinded_path = BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
 		&intermediate_nodes,
 		nodes[3].node_id,
+		5,
 		receive_key,
 		context,
 		entropy,
diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
index 38c8cd304d9..d95a6d6cf66 100644
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ use super::packet::{
 #[cfg(async_payments)]
 use crate::blinded_path::message::AsyncPaymentsContext;
 use crate::blinded_path::message::{
-	BlindedMessagePath, DNSResolverContext, ForwardTlvs, MessageContext, MessageForwardNode,
-	NextMessageHop, OffersContext, ReceiveTlvs,
+	BlindedMessagePath, DNSResolverContext, DummyTlv, ForwardTlvs, MessageContext,
+	MessageForwardNode, NextMessageHop, OffersContext, ReceiveTlvs,
 };
 use crate::blinded_path::utils;
 use crate::blinded_path::{IntroductionNode, NodeIdLookUp};
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ use crate::ln::msgs::{
 	self, BaseMessageHandler, MessageSendEvent, OnionMessage, OnionMessageHandler, SocketAddress,
 };
 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
+use crate::onion_message::packet::DummyControlTlvs;
 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NodeId, ReadOnlyNetworkGraph};
 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, ReceiveAuthKey, Recipient};
 use crate::types::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
@@ -570,6 +571,25 @@ where
 		// recipient's node_id.
 		const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
 
+		// Add a random number (0 to `MAX_DUMMY_HOPS`) of dummy hops to each non-compact blinded path
+		// to make it harder to infer the recipient's position.
+		//
+		// # Note on compact paths:
+		//
+		// Compact paths are optimized for minimal size. Adding dummy hops to them
+		// would increase their size and undermine their primary advantage.
+		// Therefore, we avoid adding dummy hops to compact paths.
+		const MAX_DUMMY_HOPS: usize = 3;
+
+		let dummy_hops_count = if compact_paths {
+			0
+		} else {
+			{
+				let random_byte: usize = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[0].into();
+				random_byte % (MAX_DUMMY_HOPS + 1)
+			}
+		};
+
 		let network_graph = network_graph.deref().read_only();
 		let is_recipient_announced =
 			network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
@@ -604,9 +624,10 @@ where
 		let paths = peer_info
 			.into_iter()
 			.map(|(peer, _, _)| {
-				BlindedMessagePath::new(
+				BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
 					&[peer],
 					recipient,
+					dummy_hops_count,
 					local_node_receive_key,
 					context.clone(),
 					entropy,
@@ -620,9 +641,10 @@ where
 			Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
 			_ => {
 				if is_recipient_announced {
-					BlindedMessagePath::new(
+					BlindedMessagePath::new_with_dummy_hops(
 						&[],
 						recipient,
+						dummy_hops_count,
 						local_node_receive_key,
 						context,
 						&**entropy_source,
@@ -1150,6 +1172,44 @@ where
 		msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
 		(control_tlvs_ss, custom_handler.deref(), receiving_context_auth_key, logger.deref()),
 	);
+
+	// Constructs the next onion message using packet data and blinding logic.
+	let compute_onion_message = |packet_pubkey: PublicKey,
+	                             next_hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
+	                             new_packet_bytes: Vec<u8>,
+	                             blinding_point_opt: Option<PublicKey>|
+	 -> Result<OnionMessage, ()> {
+		let new_pubkey =
+			match onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&secp_ctx, packet_pubkey, &onion_decode_ss) {
+				Ok(pk) => pk,
+				Err(e) => {
+					log_trace!(logger, "Failed to compute next hop packet pubkey: {}", e);
+					return Err(());
+				},
+			};
+		let outgoing_packet = Packet {
+			version: 0,
+			public_key: new_pubkey,
+			hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
+			hmac: next_hop_hmac,
+		};
+		let blinding_point = match blinding_point_opt {
+			Some(bp) => bp,
+			None => match onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
+				&secp_ctx,
+				msg.blinding_point,
+				control_tlvs_ss.as_ref(),
+			) {
+				Ok(bp) => bp,
+				Err(e) => {
+					log_trace!(logger, "Failed to compute next blinding point: {}", e);
+					return Err(());
+				},
+			},
+		};
+		Ok(OnionMessage { blinding_point, onion_routing_packet: outgoing_packet })
+	};
+
 	match next_hop {
 		Ok((
 			Payload::Receive {
@@ -1223,6 +1283,26 @@ where
 				Err(())
 			},
 		},
+		Ok((
+			Payload::Dummy {
+				control_tlvs_authenticated,
+				control_tlvs: DummyControlTlvs(DummyTlv {}),
+			},
+			Some((next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes)),
+		)) => {
+			if !control_tlvs_authenticated {
+				log_trace!(logger, "Received an unauthenticated dummy onion message");
+				return Err(());
+			}
+
+			let onion_message = compute_onion_message(
+				msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key,
+				next_hop_hmac,
+				new_packet_bytes,
+				None,
+			)?;
+			peel_onion_message(&onion_message, secp_ctx, node_signer, logger, custom_handler)
+		},
 		Ok((
 			Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(ForwardTlvs {
 				next_hop,
@@ -1230,46 +1310,12 @@ where
 			})),
 			Some((next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes)),
 		)) => {
-			// TODO: we need to check whether `next_hop` is our node, in which case this is a dummy
-			// blinded hop and this onion message is destined for us. In this situation, we should keep
-			// unwrapping the onion layers to get to the final payload. Since we don't have the option
-			// of creating blinded paths with dummy hops currently, we should be ok to not handle this
-			// for now.
-			let packet_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key;
-			let new_pubkey_opt =
-				onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&secp_ctx, packet_pubkey, &onion_decode_ss);
-			let new_pubkey = match new_pubkey_opt {
-				Ok(pk) => pk,
-				Err(e) => {
-					log_trace!(logger, "Failed to compute next hop packet pubkey: {}", e);
-					return Err(());
-				},
-			};
-			let outgoing_packet = Packet {
-				version: 0,
-				public_key: new_pubkey,
-				hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
-				hmac: next_hop_hmac,
-			};
-			let onion_message = OnionMessage {
-				blinding_point: match next_blinding_override {
-					Some(blinding_point) => blinding_point,
-					None => {
-						match onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
-							&secp_ctx,
-							msg.blinding_point,
-							control_tlvs_ss.as_ref(),
-						) {
-							Ok(bp) => bp,
-							Err(e) => {
-								log_trace!(logger, "Failed to compute next blinding point: {}", e);
-								return Err(());
-							},
-						}
-					},
-				},
-				onion_routing_packet: outgoing_packet,
-			};
+			let onion_message = compute_onion_message(
+				msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key,
+				next_hop_hmac,
+				new_packet_bytes,
+				next_blinding_override,
+			)?;
 
 			Ok(PeeledOnion::Forward(next_hop, onion_message))
 		},
diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/packet.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/packet.rs
index 301473fba6a..5b2bf63c1a5 100644
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/packet.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/packet.rs
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ use super::async_payments::AsyncPaymentsMessage;
 use super::dns_resolution::DNSResolverMessage;
 use super::messenger::CustomOnionMessageHandler;
 use super::offers::OffersMessage;
-use crate::blinded_path::message::{BlindedMessagePath, ForwardTlvs, NextMessageHop, ReceiveTlvs};
+use crate::blinded_path::message::{
+	BlindedMessagePath, DummyTlv, ForwardTlvs, NextMessageHop, ReceiveTlvs,
+};
 use crate::crypto::streams::{ChaChaDualPolyReadAdapter, ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter};
 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
@@ -112,6 +114,13 @@ impl LengthReadable for Packet {
 pub(super) enum Payload<T: OnionMessageContents> {
 	/// This payload is for an intermediate hop.
 	Forward(ForwardControlTlvs),
+	/// This payload is a dummy hop, and is intended to be peeled.
+	Dummy {
+		/// The [`DummyControlTlvs`] were authenticated with the additional key that was
+		/// provided to [`ReadableArgs::read`].
+		control_tlvs_authenticated: bool,
+		control_tlvs: DummyControlTlvs,
+	},
 	/// This payload is for the final hop.
 	Receive {
 		/// The [`ReceiveControlTlvs`] were authenticated with the additional key which was
@@ -212,6 +221,9 @@ pub(super) enum ForwardControlTlvs {
 	Unblinded(ForwardTlvs),
 }
 
+/// Dummy control TLVs, used for dummy hops.
+pub(super) struct DummyControlTlvs(pub(super) DummyTlv);
+
 /// Receive control TLVs in their blinded and unblinded form.
 pub(super) enum ReceiveControlTlvs {
 	/// See [`ForwardControlTlvs::Blinded`].
@@ -243,6 +255,13 @@ impl<T: OnionMessageContents> Writeable for (Payload<T>, [u8; 32]) {
 				let write_adapter = ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter::new(self.1, &control_tlvs);
 				_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, { (4, write_adapter, required) })
 			},
+			Payload::Dummy {
+				control_tlvs: DummyControlTlvs(control_tlvs),
+				control_tlvs_authenticated: _,
+			} => {
+				let write_adapter = ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter::new(self.1, &control_tlvs);
+				_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, { (4, write_adapter, required) })
+			},
 			Payload::Receive {
 				control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(control_tlvs),
 				reply_path,
@@ -323,6 +342,12 @@ impl<H: CustomOnionMessageHandler + ?Sized, L: Logger + ?Sized>
 				}
 				Ok(Payload::Forward(ForwardControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs)))
 			},
+			Some(ChaChaDualPolyReadAdapter { readable: ControlTlvs::Dummy(tlvs), used_aad }) => {
+				Ok(Payload::Dummy {
+					control_tlvs_authenticated: used_aad,
+					control_tlvs: DummyControlTlvs(tlvs),
+				})
+			},
 			Some(ChaChaDualPolyReadAdapter { readable: ControlTlvs::Receive(tlvs), used_aad }) => {
 				Ok(Payload::Receive {
 					control_tlvs: ReceiveControlTlvs::Unblinded(tlvs),
@@ -342,6 +367,8 @@ impl<H: CustomOnionMessageHandler + ?Sized, L: Logger + ?Sized>
 pub(crate) enum ControlTlvs {
 	/// This onion message is intended to be forwarded.
 	Forward(ForwardTlvs),
+	/// This onion message is a dummy, and is intended to be peeled.
+	Dummy(DummyTlv),
 	/// This onion message is intended to be received.
 	Receive(ReceiveTlvs),
 }
@@ -357,6 +384,7 @@ impl Readable for ControlTlvs {
 			(4, next_node_id, option),
 			(8, next_blinding_override, option),
 			(65537, context, option),
+			(65539, is_dummy, option),
 		});
 
 		let next_hop = match (short_channel_id, next_node_id) {
@@ -366,18 +394,13 @@ impl Readable for ControlTlvs {
 			(None, None) => None,
 		};
 
-		let valid_fwd_fmt = next_hop.is_some();
-		let valid_recv_fmt = next_hop.is_none() && next_blinding_override.is_none();
-
-		let payload_fmt = if valid_fwd_fmt {
-			ControlTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs {
-				next_hop: next_hop.unwrap(),
-				next_blinding_override,
-			})
-		} else if valid_recv_fmt {
-			ControlTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs { context })
-		} else {
-			return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+		let payload_fmt = match (next_hop, next_blinding_override, is_dummy) {
+			(Some(hop), _, None) => {
+				ControlTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs { next_hop: hop, next_blinding_override })
+			},
+			(None, None, Some(())) => ControlTlvs::Dummy(DummyTlv {}),
+			(None, None, None) => ControlTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs { context }),
+			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 		};
 
 		Ok(payload_fmt)
@@ -388,6 +411,7 @@ impl Writeable for ControlTlvs {
 	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
 		match self {
 			Self::Forward(tlvs) => tlvs.write(w),
+			Self::Dummy(tlvs) => tlvs.write(w),
 			Self::Receive(tlvs) => tlvs.write(w),
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs b/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs
index 057a7406a5a..a8f2d30d273 100644
--- a/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/sign/mod.rs
@@ -837,19 +837,25 @@ pub trait EntropySource {
 
 /// A trait that can handle cryptographic operations at the scope level of a node.
 pub trait NodeSigner {
-	/// Get the [`ExpandedKey`] for use in encrypting and decrypting inbound payment data.
+	/// Get the [`ExpandedKey`] which provides cryptographic material for various Lightning Network operations.
+	///
+	/// This key set is used for:
+	/// - Encrypting and decrypting inbound payment metadata
+	/// - Authenticating payment hashes (both LDK-provided and user-provided)
+	/// - Supporting BOLT 12 Offers functionality (key derivation and authentication)
+	/// - Authenticating spontaneous payments' metadata
 	///
 	/// If the implementor of this trait supports [phantom node payments], then every node that is
 	/// intended to be included in the phantom invoice route hints must return the same value from
-	/// this method.
-	// This is because LDK avoids storing inbound payment data by encrypting payment data in the
-	// payment hash and/or payment secret, therefore for a payment to be receivable by multiple
-	// nodes, they must share the key that encrypts this payment data.
+	/// this method. This is because LDK avoids storing inbound payment data by encrypting payment
+	/// data in the payment hash and/or payment secret, therefore for a payment to be receivable by
+	/// multiple nodes, they must share the key that encrypts this payment data.
 	///
-	/// This method must return the same value each time it is called.
+	/// Consistent return values across nodes are also essential for verifying signatures and decrypting
+	/// payment data in both Offers and spontaneous payments.
 	///
 	/// [phantom node payments]: PhantomKeysManager
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey;
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey;
 
 	/// Defines a method to derive a 32-byte encryption key for peer storage.
 	///
@@ -2184,7 +2190,7 @@ impl NodeSigner for KeysManager {
 		Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
 	}
 
@@ -2357,7 +2363,7 @@ impl NodeSigner for PhantomKeysManager {
 		Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
 	}
 
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/dyn_signer.rs b/lightning/src/util/dyn_signer.rs
index fc2f6329aeb..b040ecab6f4 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/dyn_signer.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/dyn_signer.rs
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ inner,
 	fn sign_bolt12_invoice(,
 		invoice: &crate::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice
 	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()>,
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(,) -> ExpandedKey,
+	fn get_expanded_key(,) -> ExpandedKey,
 	fn get_peer_storage_key(,) -> PeerStorageKey,
 	fn get_receive_auth_key(,) -> ReceiveAuthKey
 );
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ delegate!(DynPhantomKeysInterface, NodeSigner,
 	fn sign_invoice(, invoice: &RawBolt11Invoice, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()>,
 	fn sign_bolt12_invoice(, invoice: &crate::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice
 	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()>,
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(,) -> ExpandedKey,
+	fn get_expanded_key(,) -> ExpandedKey,
 	fn get_peer_storage_key(,) -> PeerStorageKey,
 	fn get_receive_auth_key(,) -> ReceiveAuthKey
 );
diff --git a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
index 776d876bbc8..7c23e05e9f3 100644
--- a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ impl TestNodeSigner {
 }
 
 impl NodeSigner for TestNodeSigner {
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
 		unreachable!()
 	}
 
@@ -1636,8 +1636,8 @@ impl NodeSigner for TestKeysInterface {
 		self.backing.ecdh(recipient, other_key, tweak)
 	}
 
-	fn get_inbound_payment_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
-		self.backing.get_inbound_payment_key()
+	fn get_expanded_key(&self) -> ExpandedKey {
+		self.backing.get_expanded_key()
 	}
 
 	fn sign_invoice(